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T he volume of assets traded on international financial markets 
has reached gigantic proportions. The question must arise, then, as to 
whether international finance might play a decisive role in the provision of 
stable resources in the quantities needed to fund development. This article 
analyses the function that international finance might perform and that it 
actually has performed, focusing specifically on the analysis of private 
capital flows, official development assistance and external borrowing. It 
concludes that there need to be far-reaching structural reforms in the 
workings of the international financial system and in development financing 
instruments and mechanisms if these are to be placed at the service of 
long-term development goals.
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Even the most unsophisticated analyses of 
international financial statistics reveal a huge 
disparity between the amount of assets circulating 
in international financial markets and the volume of 
such assets destined for the financing of development 
activities. For example, the latest official data show 
that assets worth US$ 3.2 trillion are traded on the 
currency market each day, giving a range of between 
US$ 832 trillion and US$ 1,000 trillion during 
2007 in that market alone (bis, 2007). Meanwhile, 
the leading providers of  official development 
assistance donated a little over US$ 100 billion in 
such assistance between them in 2007 (oecd, 2008), 
whereas the most rigorous studies of  the subject 
estimate that at least a further US$ 50 billion would 
be needed each year to achieve the main long-term 
development objectives (Atkinson, 2005).
The astonishing scale of  transactions in 
international financial markets is the outcome of a 
long process of international financial liberalization 
which has been intensifying the interconnections 
between national banking, monetary and financial 
systems and leading to the de facto emergence 
of  a global financial space to which they are 
being subordinated. This process, in turn, is a 
consequence of  a radical overhaul of  the system 
for regulating financial operations and overseeing 
capital movements that began with the opening of 
the Euromarket in the late 1950s, gained irresistible 
momentum in the 1970s and intensified in the 
following two decades.
This phenomenon of  financial globalization 
is the outcome of  a complex process that can be 
characterized by a number of  elements, including 
an increased technical ability to develop advanced 
financial relationships, the integration of  national 
markets and local agents into a more global 
market, a blurring of  the traditional distinctions 
between financial institutions of various kinds and 
the businesses and markets they serve, and the 
emergence of banking and financial conglomerates 
of global proportions.1
1 For a detailed analysis see, for example, Palazuelos (1998).
I
Introduction
At the same time, financial globalization 
has consolidated two kinds of  asymmetries of 
immense importance: first, a situation in which a 
clearly hegemonic currency of reference, the dollar, 
underpins all financial and trading relationships,2 
and second, an apparently democratized global 
financial market with innumerable small agents 
interacting freely within it, although a more detailed 
analysis reveals a clearly oligopolistic market in 
which a very small number of  agents control the 
bulk of  the resources channelled through it and 
there is clear evidence of  herd behaviour among 
them (García-Arias, 2006).
This process of  financial internationalization 
and liberalization, which had its theoretical roots in 
the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics 
(ftwe) and the efficient-market hypothesis (emh),3 
was meant to produce a win-win situation for all 
international actors. In general, capital would flow 
from highly developed countries (where it was 
in surplus and thus lower-yielding) to emerging 
countries (which were capital-deficient, so that 
returns on this factor were higher); this would 
speed up growth in the recipient countries and 
both the providers and recipients would benefit, as 
each would have greater opportunities of financial 
diversification. This general framework of potential 
benefits was supplemented by some more specific 
2 The hegemonic role of  the United States in this context of 
financial globalization is not manifested solely in the central 
role played by its currency. It also translates, for example, into 
the ability to implement economic policies that other economies 
would be unable to sustain, such as running twin deficits (current 
account deficit and fiscal deficit) and attracting external resources 
(partly to finance these twin deficits) on a scale that affects 
the availability of  resources for other economies and thus the 
financing of development.
3 In general, the fundamental theorem of welfare economics is 
concerned with efficiency in the real economy and the efficient-
market hypothesis links financial markets to macroeconomic 
fundamentals. In combination, they reflect a situation in which 
economic efficiency depends on liberalized factor, financial and 
goods and services markets and the smallest possible public 
sector. Financial liberalization (like other kinds) must necessarily 
be beneficial insofar as it would remove distortions affecting the 
free play of market forces, such distortions being, it is argued, 
inherently inefficient. See García-Arias (2002b) for a theoretical 
analysis.
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ones, such as increased competitiveness and 
efficiency in the system, international diversification 
of  investment portfolios, higher expected returns, 
lower risk and much else.
This idyllic, mythological view of the operation 
of  liberalized capital markets was suspended, to 
say the least, following a proliferation of  studies 
calling it into question and empirically identifying 
problems representing serious cause for concern. 
The main problems include the unequal growth 
in opportunities for lenders and borrowers, the 
shifting of  net resources to more developed 
countries, the enormous volatility of  capital flows 
to countries with lower rates of  development, the 
increased fragility of  the international financial 
system owing to the intensification of  currency, 
banking and financial crises and the increase in 
excessive borrowing from abroad.4 All this has 
been compounded by problems relating to both the 
origins (illegal activities, money-laundering) and 
the destinations (financing of  illegal activities, tax 
havens) of  this gigantic volume of capital.
In short, international finance could undoubtedly 
make a huge contribution to the growth and 
development of  all the world’s economies and to 
the well-being of humankind. There are difficulties, 
however, arising from the origin of the capital, its 
type, the way it circulates and its destination.
Thus, the many challenges thrown up by the 
financial internationalization and liberalization 
process have generated a major debate about the 
need to rethink this process and, above all, to modify 
the international financial architecture.5
From the development point of view, however, 
the main problem is that this process has not 
led to adequate capital flows being channelled to 
developing economies, let alone the least developed. 
There is a need, then, to analyse the relationship, not 
always an idyllic one, between these two phenomena: 
international finance and development.
II
International finance and development
1. The situation at the turn of the century
Until the early twenty-first century, international 
capital flows to developing countries had a number 
of  distinctive characteristics (Ocampo, 1999a). 
First, institutional and private capital flows followed 
divergent trends: whereas the former were tending 
to diminish, the latter had been growing over the 
medium term.
Second, the different types of  private capital 
flows differed enormously in terms of  stability: 
whereas foreign direct investment (fdi) held up 
well during crises, private-sector financial flows 
showed marked volatility and contagion effects. In 
contrast to the dynamism of private capital flows, 
meanwhile, official development financing (and 
especially its main component, bilateral assistance 
funds) showed signs of  aid fatigue, declining in real 
terms over the decade.
Third, private capital flows went mainly to 
middle-income countries, a trend only partly offset 
by the redistributive effects of public-sector financial 
flows at the world level.
Lastly, the volatility of private-sector financial 
flows, and the extent to which they were concentrated 
in middle-income countries, ended up by generating 
exceptional financing needs that were unprecedented 
in scale. This exceptional financing went to just a 
5 While the idea of reforming the international financial architecture 
is variously understood by different authors, we normally include 
under this heading (the list is not necessarily exhaustive) aspects 
relating to: (i) improved transparency and accounting standards, 
(ii) increased self-regulation and/or external supervision, (iii) 
modification of capital account management mechanisms, (iv) 
alterations in the choice of exchange-rate regimes, (v) the design 
of national economic policies and those proposed by international 
economic organizations, (vi) the provision of international liquidity 
and (vii) lender of  last resort mechanisms and international 
bankruptcies and defaults. The issue has been intensively studied 
in the economic literature, with exponential growth in the last 
decade. The present paper obviously does not set out to expound 
the different contributions and approaches to the issue, but the 
interested reader may consult Caballero (2003), Eatwell (2002), 
Eichengreen (1999), Griffith-Jones, Gottschalk and Cailloux (2003), 
Kenen (2001) and Ocampo (1999b), among many others.
4 It is beyond the scope of this essay to analyse these matters 
in detail. See Agüera Sirgo and García-Arias (2000) for a more 
in-depth analysis of the promises and realities of this process 
of financial liberalization and internationalization.
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few emerging economies. Consequently, financing 
from the International Monetary Fund (imf), 
including that provided under the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility, displayed a marked 
countercyclical tendency in relation to private capital 
flows and went only to a small number of countries, 
which were required to comply with economic policy 
requirements (structural adjustment) too well known 
to need recounting here.
In this state of affairs, while the volatility and 
contagion characterizing private capital flows were 
undoubtedly problematic, so were the exclusion 
of the poorest countries from these flows and the 
reduction of the bilateral assistance on which they 
largely depended. Reform of  the international 
financial structure therefore had to provide solutions 
to all these problems. Furthermore, the excessive 
borrowings of many developing countries, especially 
the poorest, continued to place severe constraints on 
their development potential.
In this context, the heads of  State and 
government meeting at the International Conference 
on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico 
under the auspices of the United Nations adopted a 
resolution to deal with problems of this nature: the 
Monterrey Consensus (United Nations, 2002).
2. The Monterrey Consensus
The Monterrey Consensus is built on the idea 
that international development cooperation needs 
to be treated as a task for developed countries 
and underdeveloped and/or developing countries 
(udcs) alike.
More specifically, in this alliance each udc 
accepts that it has primary responsibility for its own 
development and that it must (i) improve its internal 
governance, (ii) fight corruption, (iii) implement 
policies and investments conducive to growth 
and employment and (iv) maximize the domestic 
resources available to finance additional development 
strategies. For their part, the developed countries 
agree that those udcs which adopt transparent, 
credible and well-designed development strategies 
should receive maximum support in the form of 
(i) greater development assistance, (ii) a more 
development-oriented international trade system, 
(iii) debt relief  or forgiveness measures and (iv) an 
increase in private-sector development financing. 
Lastly, the international institutions standing behind 
the Consensus agree (i) to act more consistently, (ii) 
to coordinate and cooperate on the planning of their 
activities and the implementation of international 
development policies and (iii) to modify the structure 
and functioning of the international financial system 
to help achieve these goals.
To this end, the Monterrey Consensus 
distinguished six main aspects relating to development: 
(i) the mobilization of local financial resources in the 
udcs themselves, (ii) the use of international trade 
as a development tool, (iii) flows of  international 
private capital into udcs, (iv) official development 
assistance, (v) external borrowing and (vi) the 
international financial system and its relationship to 
development financing.
Although the first two of  these are certainly 
crucial components of  a holistic approach to 
development financing, strictly speaking they are 
outside the sphere of  international finance on 
which the present essay focuses. Again, as already 
suggested, it is clear that the general architecture 
of  the international financial system needs to be 
modified for the purpose, among others, of turning 
financial liberalization into a dynamic force for 
development. In any event, the rest of  this paper 
will concentrate on issues related to private capital 
flows, official development assistance (oda) and 
external borrowing.
III
International private capital flows
In theory, private capital flows can play a very 
important role in the development of the recipient 
countries. As we have noted, however, the empirical 
evidence indicates that in recent decades these flows 
have not only been limited, volatile and highly 
reversible (being subject to herd behaviour and 
contagion effects), but have tended not to go to the 
poorest countries.
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Although instability, volatility and herd 
behaviour are inherent features of financial markets, 
both national and international, not all types of 
capital exhibit them in equal measure. Specifically, 
fdi is far more stable than other forms of capital 
(such as portfolio investment and bank lending).
Again, the international markets do not bear 
the whole responsibility for this situation. The 
financial systems of recipient countries also differ 
from those of  more developed countries in ways 
that increase their vulnerability. These differences 
are as follows:
— the inability of  many udcs to issue debt 
obligations denominated in their own currencies, 
particularly long-term ones (the “original sin”, 
according to Eichengreen, Hausmann and 
Panizza, 2003); this lies behind a whole range 
of weaknesses in national financial systems, as 
it ties them, essentially, to the dollar.
— differences in the development level of  their 
financial systems and capital markets, resulting 
in limited availability of  long-term financial 
instruments in these markets.
— the small size of  these countries’ domestic 
financial markets when compared to huge 
international financial markets.
The recent history of  international capital 
movements includes three waves of  private capital 
into udcs. The first two occurred in the 1970s 
and 1990s.
— In the 1970s wave, rapid growth in bank lending 
to developing countries (as the enormous 
external surpluses of  oil-producing countries 
were recycled and national and international 
financial markets were deregulated) was cut 
short by the debt crisis in Latin America (and 
other economic regions).
— The 1990s wave, dominated by fdi and portfolio 
investment flows, particularly into the countries 
of South-East Asia, was halted by the currency 
and financial crises suffered by those countries 
at the end of the decade,6 which then spread 
to Russia and Latin America.
The third wave began in 2003 and has continued 
until the present, as a result of improved economic 
conditions in the udcs, strong global economic 
growth and a consistent policy of low interest rates 
in the developed countries.
This third cycle of  renewed capital flows to 
udcs is different, however, from the two earlier 
ones (Ocampo, Kregel and Griffith-Jones, 2007). 
Specifically, in 1997-2005 there was a net transfer 
of  resources from udcs to developed countries, 
essentially owing to the huge quantity of  reserves 
being built up by developing countries (especially in 
South-East Asia) as insurance against future financial 
crises (like the one which had come to pass as this 
paper was being revised). Furthermore, capital flows 
became increasingly concentrated on udcs in East 
and South-East Asia, and most particularly China, 
at the expense of Latin America.
Against this general background of  renewed 
private capital flows into udcs, the main concern 
of the latter is not just to know whether they will 
be sufficient to finance their development, but also 
to know whether they will be reasonably stable or, 
as has consistently been the case, highly volatile 
and reversible.
The first thing to be grasped here is that, as 
mentioned earlier, not all private capital flows (i.e., 
fdi, portfolio investment and bank lending) exhibit 
the same volatility.
fdi has three main components: investment 
in capital goods, local profits reinvested locally 
and intra-firm lending. In the latest cycle, fdi, and 
especially that destined for capital goods, has become 
the main source of external financing and has proved 
throughout history to be far more stable than other 
international flows. It also has other advantages, not 
least that it increases the productivity of recipient 
countries because it is accompanied by the transfer 
of technology and know-how and facilitates access 
to international markets for goods and finance.
Nonetheless, fdi does have some drawbacks. 
For example, its ties to the local economic structure 
tend to be very limited, it exacerbates trade deficits 
and it restricts competition and venture capital 
investment in the destination countries.
While there is intensive debate about the actual 
scale of  the benefits from fdi and the time lag 
with which destination countries receive them, the 
economic literature is generally at one in agreeing 
that the net balance is positive, but with huge 
differences between and within countries.
In this latest cycle the benefits have clearly 
increased, which is encouraging, particularly because 
capital goods investment is accounting for about two 
6 See García-Arias (2002a) for a detailed analysis of the Asian 
crises.
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thirds of total fdi (World Bank, 2004). Furthermore, 
some changes in the composition and destination of 
investment have been detected. The most striking is 
its rapid growth in the service sector, chiefly owing 
to the expansion of transnational enterprises in this 
segment in udcs, often because of  privatization. 
Although the anticompetitive behaviour characteristic 
of  transnational enterprises usually has adverse 
consequences when local competition rules are lax, 
fdi in the tertiary sector has had different effects in 
the various economic areas to which it has gone. For 
example, the push of fdi into the service sector in 
Latin America appears to have had a crowding-out 
effect on local companies (Agosin and Mayer, 2000). 
Much the same has happened in the Latin American 
banking sector, although this orientation of  fdi 
towards financial sectors seems to have generated 
more positive effects in South-East Asia (Asian 
Development Bank, 2004) and in eastern European 
countries (Weller, 2001). Another important aspect 
of  fdi is the growth in South-South flows, which 
particularly benefit lower-income and less developed 
udcs. Nonetheless, an overview of  fdi reveals a 
problem: 75% of it goes to just 10 countries.
In view of all this, udcs could apply a range 
of  measures to increase the contribution made 
by fdi to their development, including: devising 
policies to strengthen ties between foreign and 
local firms; favouring exports with a high level of 
value added and the transfer of  know-how, skills 
and technology; giving foreign firms incentives to 
invest in training; and creating a favourable domestic 
economic climate by means of  infrastructure and 
training investments, transparent codes of conduct 
and regulatory stability.
Portfolio investment, meanwhile, tends to be 
procyclical and highly reversible and volatile. For 
years (in the two earlier waves) it was the main 
source of  international private capital inflows 
into udcs, peaking in 1996. From then on it fell 
off  sharply as a result of  the Asian currency and 
financial crises and the contagion from these, before 
recovering in recent years. Although its effects can 
be devastating in the event of  a rapid reversal, it 
is still the main source of debt financing in udcs, 
especially in Latin America.
Where bank lending is concerned, this can 
contribute to some extent to development, especially 
if  it is linked to international trade. It is supplied 
by banks, financial and non-financial institutions, 
official export agencies, regional development banks, 
private insurers and specialist firms.
Its share increased strongly until the 1997 crisis; 
indeed, it bore much of the responsibility for that, 
basically by driving a boom-bust cycle (García-Arias, 
2002a) and intensifying the herd behaviour of agents 
(García-Arias, 2006). Its role, particularly in the case 
of commercial lending, is of particular importance 
for low-income countries that have difficulty accessing 
other types of financing in international markets. This 
being the case, it would be advisable to encourage 
official export agencies and regional development 
banks such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank (idb) and the Asian Development Bank to 
play a countercyclical role by guaranteeing and 
underwriting lending of this type.
IV
official development assistance
1. The traditional sources of official 
development assistance
Official development assistance (oda) still plays 
an essential role in supplementing the resources of 
udcs, particularly in the case of very poor economies 
that find it especially hard to attract private capital. 
After peaking at 0.5% of the gross domestic product 
(gdp) of the most developed countries in the 1960s, 
however, this assistance fell to a historic low of 
0.22% of gdp in the run-up to the agreements of the 
United Nations Millennium Summit. The Monterrey 
Consensus restates the traditional goal of raising the 
level of assistance to at least 0.7% of donor country 
gdp (of  which at least 0.15%-0.2% should go to 
heavily indebted poor countries (hipcs).
In 2007, oda from the main donors, i.e., the 22 
member countries of  the Development Assistance 
Committee (dac), exceeded US$ 103 billion, 
although this was 8.4% less than in 2006. This 
assistance represented 0.28% of the combined gdp 
of  the countries on the Committee (oecd, 2008).
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The fall in oda after 2005 is due, paradoxically, 
to the type of  assistance items that gave rise to 
the large increase that year. Thus, external debt 
forgiveness operations accounted for some US$ 23 
billion at a time when the total increase was somewhat 
over US$ 26 billion. Discounting debt forgiveness 
operations in 2005, oda would have risen by only 
about 9% on the previous year in current dollars. 
Given the exceptional character of these assistance 
packages centred on debt forgiveness (and, to a 
much lesser degree, on emergency assistance after 
the devastating 2004 tsunami along the coasts of 
East and South-East Asia), this rate of increase was 
never likely to be sustained.
In valuing the amount of official development 
assistance, it needs to be borne in mind that, 
according to the data available, some US$ 50 billion 
dollars a year of extra oda is needed to achieve the 
most urgent development goals (United Nations, 
2001). For example, ensuring universal primary 
schooling would require an extra US$ 10 billion 
or so a year, halving extreme poverty some US$ 
20 billion more a year and reducing maternal and 
infant mortality US$ 12 billion a year (hm Treasury, 
2003). This leads to the conclusion that oda levels 
have generally been inadequate.
Furthermore, while its total value began 
growing in the late 1990s, official development 
assistance presents some major problems:
(i) Its composition. Changes in the composition 
of  oda have made this type of  assistance 
less likely to be effective in attaining sound 
development objectives. The reason is that 
the three components which have grown most 
in recent years are debt relief, emergency aid 
and technical cooperation. Although these 
all fulfil important functions, emergency 
aid is not designed to achieve long-term 
development goals and the real financial impact 
of technical cooperation is small, even though 
it may provide major development benefits. 
Where the attainment of development goals is 
concerned, therefore, oda has been declining 
as a source of financing for recipient countries. 
This situation is particularly plain in the case 
of  heavily indebted poor countries, since if  
emergency aid and debt relief  are discounted, 
official development assistance has fallen by 
almost 50% since the start of the Millennium 
Development Goals programme (Ocampo, 
Kregel and Griffith-Jones, 2007).
(ii) Its volatility. Investment and assistance flows 
need to be reasonably stable over time if  long-
term development goals are to be effectively 
attained. However, oda flows have evinced a 
clear cyclical tendency associated with business 
cycles in the donor countries, their ideological, 
political or cultural affinity with recipient 
countries and changes in their development 
policies. This situation is made particularly 
serious by the fact that oda in turn has a 
procyclical effect (Pallage and Robe, 2001; 
Bulir and Hamann, 2003): falling assistance 
levels lead to severe fiscal adjustments in the 
recipient countries (public spending cuts and 
revenue-raising measures), compounding the 
effects of the cut in assistance funding.
(iii) The conditions attached to it. Not only do 
donor countries impose specific conditions on 
recipients, but these are usually accompanied 
by a requirement for these countries to be 
members of the International Monetary Fund 
(imf) and comply to a reasonable extent with 
its structural adjustment programmes. Failure 
to comply with imf  requirements produces a 
double blow: both imf  assistance and oda 
funds from donor countries are forfeited.
(iv) Its geographical concentration. oda is largely 
confined to a few recipient countries, which are 
those that have implemented structural reforms 
with the blessing of the international financial 
organizations and are seen by donors as efficient 
administrators of aid.
Again, it needs to be understood that there is 
no conclusive empirical evidence showing oda to be 
effective at reducing poverty and stimulating growth 
and development. Numerous studies have found that 
this type of assistance works well only when it goes 
to countries that apply “sound policies”, by which are 
meant those of the Washington Consensus (World 
Bank, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and 
Dollar, 2001). Other papers, conversely, put the 
findings of these studies down to problems with the 
econometric specification of the models (Hansen and 
Tarp, 2000; Beynon, 2003), and even find evidence 
that assistance enhances growth irrespective of the 
“political environment” (Morrissey, 2001). Some 
indeed conclude that it is not “sound policies” but 
other variables such as economic vulnerability, the 
existence of  external shocks (Collier and Dehn, 
2001), the presence of conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2002) or even geographical factors (Dalgaard 
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and Hansen, 2001) that significantly influence the 
effectiveness of such assistance.
Nonetheless, the issues of  good governance, 
institutional change and the implementation of 
orthodox policies continue to dominate the debate.
In any event, donor countries are increasingly 
concerned about issues relating to the effectiveness 
of their assistance. In 2003, the High-Level Forum 
on Harmonization was held in Rome, followed 
by the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
Paris, with a view to drawing up a plan of action to 
harmonize donors’ assistance policies and practices 
and procedures, both among themselves and with 
recipient countries.
Another interesting element of  oda is what 
has been called South-South cooperation, i.e., 
the fact that some udcs donate development 
assistance to other udcs. While the leading donor 
has traditionally been Saudi Arabia, followed by the 
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, other nations 
such as China and the Republic of  Korea have 
begun to participate and their weight is growing. 
These countries basically concentrate on technical 
cooperation or consultation and coordination 
forums, usually in specific economic or sectoral areas 
(one example is the ibsa Dialogue Forum, involving 
India, Brazil and South Africa).
2. Innovative development financing instruments
In recent years, owing mainly to the political difficulty 
of  attaining the 0.7% goal for oda as a share of 
donor country gdp, a number of  non-traditional 
development financing proposals have appeared. 
They are very diverse, but in all cases the aim is to 
rapidly increase the volume of financial resources 
going to the development of poor countries with a 
view to maximizing the likelihood of the Millennium 
Development Goals being met by 2015.
In its S-24/2 resolution of  1 July 2000, the 
United Nations General Assembly itself  called for a 
rigorous analysis of advantages, disadvantages and 
other implications of a heterogeneous assortment of 
“new and innovative sources of funding, both public 
and private”. The European Commission has also 
promoted study and debate in relation to these new 
development financing sources (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2005).7
This assortment of  innovative development 
financing tools contains very heterogeneous 
proposals, but some of  the main ones are: (i) 
platforms for issuing new financial instruments 
that can be used to advance development funding, 
such as the proposed International Finance Facility 
(iff) or the issuing of  new special drawing rights 
at the imf, (ii) donations to public-private alliances 
and global funds, (iii) measures to give migrants’ 
remittances a greater impact on development, (iv) 
global taxes (on certain financial transactions, the 
arms trade, emissions of  polluting gases or air 
tickets) and (v) a world lottery.
The International Finance Facility is a 
development financing mechanism proposed by the 
United Kingdom (hm Treasury, 2003) that would 
allow aid disbursements to be prefinanced under 
a borrowing plan guaranteed by the participating 
States with a view to doubling current assistance 
flows so that the Millennium Goals can be met. This 
instrument would provide a new source of  stable, 
predictable financing and would work as follows: 
first it would accept irrevocable formal multi-year 
commitments of  future contributions from donor 
countries, which would be its shareholders; then 
it would issue bonds on the financial markets, 
repayment of  which would be guaranteed by the 
donors’ commitments. Being fully backed, these 
bonds would enjoy the highest credit rating, meaning 
that funding could be raised at interest rates lower 
than those the udcs would have to pay if  they 
borrowed themselves; lastly, the revenue generated 
by the bond issue would be distributed to developing 
countries in the form of  donations, never loans. 
Furthermore, the funds would be “earmarked” 
for specific countries, programmes or projects 
determined by the donor countries, which could also 
set conditions for disbursement of the aid.
Special drawing rights (sdrs) are international 
reserve assets issued by the imf  to supplement the 
official reserves of  member countries. They are 
allocated in proportion to each member’s quota 
in the Fund and also act as an international unit 
of  account, and their value is based on a basket 
of  key international currencies. sdrs represent 
a potential claim on the freely usable currencies 
of  imf  members. Holders of  sdrs can obtain 
these currencies in exchange for their sdrs in two 
7 Some steps have been taken in this direction, since the United 
Nations has financed and published a study of  the subject 
by well-regarded world specialists in development financing 
(Atkinson, 2005).
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ways: first, through the arrangement of voluntary 
exchanges between members; and second, by the imf  
designating members with strong external positions 
to purchase sdrs from members with weak external 
positions. Only governments, central banks, the imf  
and a few other official holders can own sdrs. The 
allocation of sdrs provides each member with a free 
asset on which net interest is receivable and payable 
at the same rate. Consequently, if  a member’s sdr 
holdings rise above its allocation, it earns interest on 
the excess; conversely, if  it holds fewer sdrs than 
allocated, it pays interest on the shortfall.
A proposal for a special one-time allocation of 
sdrs was approved by the imf  Board of Governors 
in September 1997 through the proposed Fourth 
Amendment of  the Articles of  Agreement. This 
allocation would double cumulative sdr allocations 
to sdr 42.9 billion. Its intent is to enable all 
members of the imf, old and new, to participate in 
the increase in sdr reserves on an equitable basis. 
However, the Fourth Amendment has not yet come 
into force because the necessary consensus among 
imf  members has still to be achieved. The first 
requirement is thus to obtain the political support 
needed for approval. Subsequently, the developed 
countries (which hold 60% of quotas) could reach an 
agreement to place their allocations at the disposal 
of  developing countries or multilateral funds that 
are in a position to carry out countercyclical lending 
appropriate to udc needs.
Migrants’ remittances, which World Bank 
figures put at some US$ 200 billion in 2006, can 
be important to development, essentially for two 
reasons: (i) they are usually less procyclical than other 
private capital flows, making them a more stable and 
predictable financing source; (ii) remittance income 
tends to be spent on things like food, housing and 
basic services, thus providing an alternative social 
security network for udcs. Since intermediation and 
transfer costs for remittances are substantial, any 
significant reduction in these would have a direct 
impact on the struggle for development. In view of 
this, the most important concrete objectives must be 
to lower sending costs and encourage physical and 
human capital investment and the use of banking 
services in the countries receiving remittances.
Where public-private alliances and global 
funds are concerned, the idea is to create stronger 
tax and economic incentives for private giving so 
that savers become involved with the system of 
solidarity financing, thereby providing support for 
the economic initiatives of partners and of natural 
or legal persons currently excluded from the banking 
system. Specifically, consideration is being given to 
the establishment of new mechanisms to encourage 
consumers, producers, philanthropists and bankers to 
contribute to international solidarity measures. One 
example of such mechanisms is the use of labelling 
that identifies donors and of payment methods that 
act as intermediaries in these operations (credit 
cards, for example).
Again, monetary and financial assets are 
traded in large, deep, liquid markets, many of 
them operating globally. International financial 
transactions (involving currency and securities) thus 
represent an attractive and highly dynamic tax base, 
whence the idea of taxing them.
Very low tax rates (0.1%-0.2% in the more 
ambitious proposals, 0.01%-0.02% in the more 
moderate ones)8 could yield large revenues, provided 
they are applied in a reasonably coordinated way 
between the main financial centres. Furthermore, 
these taxes could help to correct externalities if  
they put a stop to transactions considered to be 
of zero or negative utility from the standpoint of 
market efficiency because they produce excessive 
price volatility.9
The effect of such a tax on investment decisions 
would probably be very slight compared to the 
effect of other measures or the impact of prudential 
regulation on the portfolio decisions of  many 
financial organizations and intermediaries.
Taxes on financial transactions are often 
criticized from the standpoint of economic efficiency. 
It is complained that they would raise the costs 
and reduce the volume of  transactions; that they 
would artificially alter the time horizon of investors 
at the expense of the short term; that they would 
reduce market liquidity and could thereby contribute 
indirectly to higher volatility; and that by their very 
nature they would give rise to cascade effects. It is 
also argued that their real impact cannot be known 
or foreseen and could be much greater than the 
theoretical burden of the tax; that their incidence 
would be arbitrary and would give rise to a risk 
of  double taxation (particularly in the case of 
8 See Nissanke (2005) for a detailed analysis of proposals.
9 Currency operations are seen as a special case; one possible 
objective of a tax on currency transactions would be to combat 
speculation and help stabilize exchange rates (Agüera Sirgo and 
García-Arias, 2000).
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transactions conducted through intermediaries or 
mutual funds); and that there would be a high risk 
of evasion. Nonetheless, the latest contributions to 
the debate (Nissanke, 2005) seem to have shown that 
there are technical mechanisms for establishing this 
tax and minimizing distortions from it. Clearly, the 
only obstacle remaining is a political one (Agüera 
Sirgo and García-Arias, 2000).
In the economic literature there have been a 
variety of  proposals for taxing different activities 
that generate negative environmental externalities, 
e.g., so-called Pigovian taxes or, when they relate to 
protection of the environment, environmental taxes. 
Of  all these proposals, the one that has received 
most attention is a tax on greenhouse gas emissions 
(most particularly CO2). This area of environmental 
taxation, which is beyond the scope of the present 
essay, may be the one that has generated the most 
publications in recent years.10
Some conclusions about these innovative 
financing instruments (Atkinson, 2005) should be 
set out here:
(i) the only two global taxes capable of generating 
enough revenue to meet the budgetary objective 
in question (an extra US$ 50 billion or so 
annually) are a tax on international financial 
transactions and a tax on CO2 emissions. Both 
are technically feasible and would have a limited 
impact on efficiency and output.
(ii) given that technically and politically viable 
tax rates are at the lower end of the possible 
range, there is little chance of them yielding a 
double dividend. There will surely be no option 
but to choose between development financing 
instruments and instruments for dealing with 
negative externalities.
(iii) there are alternatives to global taxes: the 
extra resources needed could be raised just by 
implementing the International Finance Facility 
so that the required 0.7% of developed country 
gdp was spent on development cooperation.
(iv) advance estimates of  the overall economic 
impact of the different policy instruments can 
only be approximate. Until these measures are 
implemented it will be impossible to ascertain 
their true impact and the total benefits and 
costs associated with them.
Of the measures proposed, only three innovative 
initiatives have been tried out: a tax on airline tickets, 
the International Finance Facility for Immunisation 
(iffim) and advance market commitments (amcs), 
designed to ensure there will be viable markets 
in future for vaccines or drugs currently being 
researched (Olivié and Steinberg, 2007).
In 2004, France, Chile and the United Kingdom 
proposed the creation of a national (not global) tax 
on airline tickets. At the Conference on Innovative 
Development Financing (Paris, February 2006), 
Brazil, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Gabon, 
Jordan, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Nicaragua and the United Kingdom supported the 
proposal and undertook to create the tax in the 
medium term, but without setting a specific deadline. 
Some 20 countries have now given their support to 
the initiative. The resources raised will be managed 
by unitaid (an organization created in September 
2006 as part of  the World Health Organization) 
with a view to improving access to treatments for 
hiv-aids, malaria and tuberculosis in udcs at 
below-market prices. Although the amount raised is 
not expected to be great (about US$ 450 million a 
year), for the first time it has been shown that, with 
political will, it is possible to design and implement 
innovative taxes internationally.
The International Finance Facility for 
Immunisation, mentioned above, was created 
because there was not enough agreement to 
implement the iff  proposal (the basic stumbling 
blocks being governance, the use of funds and levels 
of leverage). This being so, the decision was taken 
to set up a kind of  scaled-down iff  to finance a 
major vaccination programme.
Accordingly, all the new funding raised will 
be used to finance health programmes, particularly 
vaccinations. This is because there is a consensus that 
vaccination is linked to global public goods with high 
long-term yields and that failing to act (vaccinate) 
would undermine the growth and development 
potential of  the udcs. The project, which began 
operating in November 2006 and will generate US$ 4 
billion a year up to 2015, is being financed by Austria, 
Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, and by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation. The resources raised by donations from 
these contributors will be managed and distributed by 
the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization 
(gavi), whose participants include the World Bank, 
the World Health Organization (who), unicef, the 
10 See Sandmo (2005) for an excellent evaluation of the scope 
for generating development financing revenue from environmental 
taxes, and for a review of the literature on the subject.
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Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and a number 
of donor and recipient country governments. The 
donations are earmarked for purchasing vaccinations 
and distributing them to 72 countries with annual 
per capita income of less than US$ 1,000, which will 
accelerate compliance with a number of Millennium 
Development Goals in lower-income countries by 
directly reducing child mortality and improving 
maternal health and indirectly reducing poverty and 
improving education.
Where amcs are concerned, the goal is nothing 
less than to alter the structure of incentives for large 
transnational pharmaceutical companies so that 
these invest more in researching and producing drugs 
and vaccinations to cure or prevent diseases that 
are hugely prevalent in udcs. The development of 
these drugs and vaccinations will take an enormous 
amount of  investment, and the poverty of  the 
countries affected by these evils means there is no 
guarantee of there being a market in which to sell 
them. In view of this, in February 2007 a number 
of countries (Canada, Italy, Norway, Russia and the 
United Kingdom) and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation donated US$ 1.5 billion to promote 
research into a vaccine against pneumococcus 
disease. Although this measure has been criticized 
for not focusing on the search for a vaccine against 
malaria or hiv-aids, it may provide an empirical 
demonstration of the effectiveness of  this type of 
system, with a view to its future implementation.
V
External borrowing
Borrowing from abroad has traditionally been a 
way for udcs to supplement and enhance their 
domestic resources. Since all borrowing entails the 
payment of interest, however, these countries have 
been faced with growing debt service requirements 
which have impaired their growth prospects and 
required repeated restructuring or renegotiation of 
their borrowings (debt crises).
Given that debt servicing absorbs a large 
proportion of  the official assistance and private 
capital flows received by udcs, the Monterrey 
Consensus established that reducing or eliminating 
this cost was a very important additional source of 
development financing. Naturally, lower debt has to 
be accompanied by policies to mobilize the domestic 
resources of the recipient countries and to channel the 
resources freed from the burden of debt towards the 
attainment of long-term development goals. Again, 
total or partial debt forgiveness will only be effective 
if  the borrowing carried out by these countries from 
that time on is kept at sustainable levels and is within 
their economic capacity to repay.
A historical analysis of the evolution of udc 
borrowing reveals an especially dramatic situation: 
while most countries began to reduce their debt 
burden in the 1990s, the poorest and most heavily 
indebted countries saw that burden increase. 
Consequently, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(hipc) Initiative was implemented in 1996 with a view 
to reducing these countries’ debt levels, renegotiating 
their Paris Club loans and allocating the resources 
thus liberated to development objectives.
Although the hipc Initiative initially covered a 
period of three years, an extension was agreed in 1999 
(the Enhanced hipc Initiative). This ended in 2006 
after benefiting 29 countries, having been extended 
from 2004. Nonetheless, the World Bank and imf  
have drawn up a list of a further 11 countries that 
qualified as of 2006 for a process of debt forgiveness 
and restructuring similar to the hipc Initiative.
In the 1996-2006 period, the effects in the 
29 countries were moderately positive. Taken all 
together, the current value of  their debts fell by 
two thirds (in 2005, debt service accounted for 2.5% 
of  gdp in these 29 countries). Debt service as a 
proportion of exports declined on average from 16% 
in 1996 to 8% in 2005. Furthermore, some of the 
savings have indeed gone on development spending; 
for example, taking all 29 countries together, public 
spending on poverty reduction programmes rose 
from 6% of gdp in 1999 to 9% in 2005.
Despite the relative success of the hipc Initiative, 
however, the large social spending commitments of 
these countries have exceeded the resources freed 
up by it, leading them to continue increasing their 
level of debt.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 6  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 8170
InTERnATIonAL fInAnCE AnD DEVELoPMEnT: oPPoRTunITy oR ThREAT?  •  JoRGE GARCíA-ARIAS
In view of  the persistence of  external debt 
problems, new initiatives have been arising to palliate 
them. For example, a United Kingdom initiative, the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (mdri), proposes 
a 100% reduction in debt servicing and a swap of 
debt for credits granted by the international financial 
institutions. Canada has made a similar proposal, 
but with bilateral financing. The United States 
has also made its contribution through the imf, 
the African Development Fund, the International 
Development Association and many other bodies.
Nonetheless, all these initiatives are aimed at 
heavily indebted poor countries, whose total debt is 
in the region of US$ 55 billion, while it is calculated 
that the total debts of  udcs are in the region of 
US$ 2.3 trillion.
Countries that are heavily indebted but not 
very poor and middle-income debtor countries 
are not included in these initiatives and can only 
hope that something will come out of the so-called 
Evian Approach of the Paris Club, which advises 
its members to take a more lenient approach to 
debt problems.
Accordingly, and while the initiatives undertaken 
so far have freed up resources for long-term 
development goals, it should not be forgotten that 
the Secretary General of  the United Nations has 
defined debt sustainability as the level of  debt 
that would allow a country to both achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals and reach 2015 
without an increase in its debt ratios (United 
Nations, 2005). Obviously, for all hipcs and for 
many low- and middle-income udcs, this would 
simply mean 100% debt cancellation.
In any event, even if  debt forgiveness were 
extended to all udcs (which is not viable at present), 
the sustainability of new borrowing would depend 
greatly on these countries’ growth prospects and 
their ability to participate in international trade. 
Debt sustainability ought to be part of a broader 
development strategy that takes a comprehensive 
and consistent approach to the issues of  trade, 
finance and debt. Linking this issue with the idea 
of reforming the international financial architecture, 
there seems to be an urgent need for an international 
bankruptcy and defaults court.
VI
Conclusions
Financial internationalization and liberalization are 
among the most salient features of  the economic 
globalization process and perfectly encapsulate the 
duality of  that process, with its combination of 
opportunity and threat.
On the one hand, it theoretically makes available 
to every economy on the planet a vast quantity of 
resources poised to move instantly to wherever 
the most profitable investment opportunities are 
to be found. On the other, there seem to be all 
kinds of difficulties along the way, such as market-
dominating oligopolistic agents driven by the herd 
instinct, resources concentrated in just a handful 
of financial centres, money-laundering, speculation, 
financing of illegal activities and recurrent financial 
and currency crises.
Where the issue of development is concerned, 
international finance displays the same dichotomy. 
Had it not grown so strongly over recent decades, 
it would be hard to account for the progress of 
economies such as China and India and those of 
South-East Asia, which have had access to constant 
flows of  international capital to finance their 
economic progress. The other udcs need private 
and public capital flows to help them escape from 
the trap of underdevelopment and poverty in which 
they find themselves.
At the same time, the international finance/
development connection brings exclusion for some 
and a threat for others: exclusion because many of 
the countries that need the most recourses are not 
among the destinations for private capital flows, a 
threat because in countries that do receive these flows 
the beneficial effects are undermined by problems of 
volatility, scarcity and geographical concentration, 
by the speculative character they often acquire, and 
most particularly by their reversibility.
In this context, oda is required to play the 
role that habitually falls to every kind of  public, 
institutional or at any rate not strictly private 
intervention: that of rectifying the imbalances and 
filling in the gaps left by the private sector (the 
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market). Despite the relatively satisfactory progress 
of  such assistance in recent years, however, there 
are still major problems to resolve. These concern, 
among other things, the inadequacy of  the total 
amounts available, their structure and composition, 
their volatility and their high degree of geographical 
concentration and conditionality.
Of all these difficulties, the one most relevant 
to the subject being studied here is the fact that 
there is not enough oda to achieve the most 
imperative development goals. As noted earlier, the 
development economics literature estimates that an 
extra US$ 50 billion of assistance a year is needed 
to meet the Millennium Development Goals by the 
deadline (United Nations, 2001; Atkinson, 2005). 
Consequently, there are three alternatives: (i) increase 
traditional oda, (ii) design and implement measures 
to secure additional financing or (iii) abandon the 
Millennium Development Goals.
If  the third option is ruled out, it seems clear 
that a combination of the first two is the alternative 
with the best prospects of success. However, given 
the tendency for total oda to decline in 2006 and 
2007 (chiefly owing to structural problems with 
its composition) and the limited progress made in 
applying the innovative financing tools analysed 
here, the Millennium Development Goals are 
becoming reminiscent of  the closing sequences of 
those old 1940s films where the hero walks away 
and is swallowed up by the fog.
To resist this image, we need to recall some of 
the recommendations put forward in this debate 
with a view to finally placing international finance 
at the service of development. In doing so, we shall 
concentrate exclusively on the three fundamental 
elements analysed in this essay: private capital flows, 
oda and innovative financing instruments.
In the first place, there will need to be deep 
reforms to the international financial architecture 
through which international private financial flows 
move. In other words, financial liberalization ought 
to be considered, if at all, as the final step in a long 
process beginning, among other measures, with the 
implementation of an appropriate institutional and 
legal framework and the creation of deep, efficient 
and transparent national financial markets with widely 
available information and sound financial regulation.
In any event, if  the decision is taken to go 
forward with this process, it ought to be supported 
by the whole of  economic policy; it should be 
sequential, selective, gradual, economy-specific 
and capable of  being slowed down or reversed if  
necessary, and it should be subject to the guidance 
and supervision of local and international economic 
authorities, who need to have appropriate oversight 
and regulation instruments available at all times 
(García-Arias, 2002a).
There is a need not only to improve the 
quantity, quality and transparency of information 
but also to adopt a more active position in the 
process, supervising and regulating financial and 
currency markets and the financial flows channelled 
through them. It is also necessary to work for the 
establishment of  an international lender of  last 
resort and an international bankruptcy and defaults 
court, take measures to combat money-laundering, 
make it harder for tax havens to be used to evade or 
avoid tax obligations and democratize international 
financial institutions.11
Second, it is important to fulfil the quantitative 
oda commitments made by devoting 0.7% of donor 
countries’ gdp to this purpose while ensuring that 
the resources provided are of high quality and, most 
importantly, are stable and constant. oda should be 
used exclusively to finance anti-inequality measures, 
access to all fundamental economic and social rights 
and the provision of global public goods.12
Third, it seems indispensable to reform oda 
instruments and rebalance the way they are 
managed so that partnership is prioritized over 
aid, with development being treated as a process 
of  economic and social progress that involves the 
reduction of inequalities and access to fundamental 
human rights for all. It is also important to support 
national development strategies decided upon by 
sovereign nations, give priority to essential services, 
recognize the vital role played by civil society 
organizations, establish real partnerships between 
donor and recipient countries, support partnerships 
between civil societies and work to enhance the 
democratic process.
Lastly, it is vital to implement some of  the 
innovative development financing methods proposed, 
specifically the suggested International Finance 
Facility (iff) and supranational taxes. Where 
iff  is concerned, it must be understood that the 
funds raised by it should be treated as strictly 
11 See García-Arias (2002b) for further details.
12 See Kaul and others (1999, 2003) and García-Arias (2002b) 
for an in-depth analysis of global public goods.
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supplementary to those deriving from other oda 
flows; should go to the poorest populations; should 
be used to guarantee the exercise of human rights 
and access to global public goods; should seek to 
keep conditionality to a minimum in general and to 
do away with such conditions as do not contribute 
directly to the attainment of  development goals; 
and should promote renewed governance, with 
democratic, representative and transparent decision-
making mechanisms in which the countries of the 
South and their representatives are partners.
Where fiscal measures are concerned, and tax 
policy in particular, supranational taxation has an 
indispensable role to play in complementing national 
taxation (given a context in which the role of public 
sectors has been affected by globalization) for at 
least three reasons (García-Arias, 2004): (i) the need 
to provide global public goods, which require stable 
and sustainable international public financing, (ii) 
the erosion of the position of public-sector economic 
authorities and especially their ability to raise the 
resources they require to meet the collective needs 
of their citizens, and (iii) the asymmetrical treatment 
given by traditional fiscal arrangements to owners 
of capital, which has undermined the traditional tax 
base of public sectors.
(Original: Spanish)
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